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Convention on
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by Danya Hamad*

In recent years, government surveillance has been a
hot topic in the Balkan country of Bulgaria.1 More
specifically, there were some concerns by the general
population regarding surveillance laws, the act of
secret surveillance, and the system of retention and
subsequent accessing of data.2 In fact, in August
2021, a special parliamentary commission in Bulgaria
found that Bulgarian special services eavesdropped
on more than 900 Bulgarians during anti-corruption
protests between 2020 and 2021.3 Many of those
targeted were students, activists, politicians,
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journalists, and others who spoke out against the
corruption of the Bulgarian government.4
In Ekimdzhiev and Others v. Bulgaria, the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) took a further look
into the issue of secret government surveillance and
determined whether there are any flaws in the legal
safeguards and oversight procedures around secret
surveillance in relation to Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).5
Covert government surveillance is legal under
Bulgarian law, specifically under the Special
Surveillance Means Act of 1997 and Articles 172
through 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.6
The legislation prescribes the methods of secret
surveillance that are permitted, including visual
surveillance, covert intrusions, eavesdropping and
tapping telephone and electronic communications,
and several other methods.7 Furthermore, Bulgarian
law permits the retention and access of such
communication data by authorities for six months.8
Additionally, under Bulgarian law, surveillance
methods are permitted to be used for matters of
national security and as when it is necessary to
prevent or detect a serious intentional offense. 9 A
serious intentional offense is one that is punishable
by more than five years of imprisonment.10 Examples
of such applicable offenses include murder and
terrorism, with drug offenses and racketeering being
the most common for which surveillance is invoked.11
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6
Id. ¶ 11.
7
Special Surveillance Means Act 1997, § 2(3) (Bulg.); Code of
Crim. Proc., art. 172 § 1 (Bulg.).
8
Ekimdzhiev, App. No. 70078/12 at ¶ 286.
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In the present case, the petitioners are two
Bulgarian nationals, Mihail Tiholov Ekimdzhiev
and Aleksander Emilov Kashamov, and two nongovernmental organizations, the Association for
European Integration and Human Rights and the
Access to Information Foundation.12 The petitioners,
who are Bulgarian lawyers, have asserted that given
the nature of their activities they are at risk of secret
surveillance and data retention, Bulgaria is a violating
their right to respect for private and family life under
Article 8 of the ECHR.13 Article 8 of the ECHR
provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect
for his private . . . life, his home, and
his correspondence. (2) There shall be
no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except
such as in . . . the interests of national
security, . . . for the prevention of disorder or crime . . . .14
More specifically, the petitioners argued that under
the current laws of Bulgaria, the communications of
anyone within the country could be intercepted, the
retained data of anyone could be accessed by authorities, and there were no sufficient safeguards in place
to protect against potential arbitrary or abusive data
access and secret surveillance.15
In its decision, the ECtHR found that Bulgaria’s surveillance violated Article 8 because it lacked proper
judicial oversight and because the lack of clear regulation, such as the process for warrant issuance, could
lead to government abuse.16 Further, the ECtHR
found issue with the oversight of the system and did
not think that the National Bureau for Control of
Special Means of Surveillance could provide effective
guarantees against abuse since many of the Bureau’s
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members were sourced from the security services and
did not have proper legal qualifications.17 Finally, the
ECtHR found that Bulgaria’s data access and retention process violated Article 8 due to lack of meaningful oversight raised concerns of potential arbitrary
or abusive data access, due to there being no duty to
examine individual complaints and the rules governing the work were not made available to the public.18
Therefore, the ECtHR ultimately concluded that
the relevant Bulgarian legislation governing secret
surveillance and the retention and accessing communications data violated Article 8.19 Lastly, the ECtHR
recognized that an appropriate form of redress would
be to make the necessary changes to domestic law to
ensure that the domestic laws are compatible with the
ECHR.20
This case can signify a change in Bulgaria and the
system of secret surveillance, given that the recent
election in Bulgaria has created a few shifts within the
government.21 More specifically, Bulgaria has been
ranked as the most corrupt member state of the European Union.22 However, in the recent parliamentary
election in Bulgaria—held in November 2021—a new
centrist anti-corruption party won the election indicating that the newly formed Bulgarian government
will not be tolerant of corruption thus leading
to reform in the secret surveillance system in respect
to its populations right to privacy.23 Perhaps the best
way to reform the system is to create a clearer and
more effective system of regulation and oversight in
Id. ¶ 281.
Id. ¶ 386.
19
Id. ¶ 419.
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order to prevent the violations of human rights under
Article 8 of the Convention.
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